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GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE, TRUST, AND THE 
CAPACITY TO PERFORM: COMPARING GOVERNANCE 
INSTITUTIONS IN THAILAND 
Bidhya Bowornwathana 
ABSTRACT 
In this article governance institutions are compared in terms of government 
interference, trust in governance institutions, and the capacity of governance 
institutions to perform. A questionnaire was administered to find out the perception of 
an expert group consisting of MPA students from Chulalongkorn University. The 
author’s understanding about recent development of Thai politics and administration 
was combined into the analysis.  The findings indicate that there is a high positive 
association between trust in governance institutions and the performance capacity of 
governance institutions.  However, trust in governance institutions was negatively 
associated with government interference in governance institutions. As of this writing 
Thailand was experiencing a period in which citizen trust in the national government 
was very low. In mid-April, 2010 the Thai Election Commission ordered the ruling 
party to be dissolved for allegedly concealing campaign contributions. Anti-government 
protesters had pressed for Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's resignation for months. 
His coalition government was further weakened as senior military officials and leaders 
of other coalition parties demanded a call for elections for a new government within a 
short period of time.      
 
INTRODUCTION 
Governance institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the National Counter 
Corruption Commission are institutions recently established in Thailand with the 
purpose of checking and balancing the use of government power by the executive: the 
prime minister and cabinet members, and bureaucrats. There are, in principle, supposed 
to be independent guardians who function as indirect representatives of citizens in 
monitoring government officials in power. Under the democratic governance paradigm 
(Bowornwathana, 2006a; 2001), citizens are the masters, and those in government are 
representatives of citizens.  But the government officials in power cannot be trusted to 
use government power at will, and they must, in turn, be monitored by outside 
independent governance institutions. In a democratic governance system, there is a 
strong mistrust of those government officials in power.  The transformation of a 
traditionally authoritarian polity into a democratic governance one is a radical shift from 
a tradition of a strong state and single-power-centered government, into a new 
governance system where government power is shared and dispersed (Bowornwathana, 
2006b). At the initial stage, the creation of governance institutions is overwhelmed by 
the attempts of the strong traditional government to interfere, intrude and control 
governance institutions through various means such as influencing the appointments of 
members of governance institutions and budget allocations (Bowornwathana, 
2008).Where government interference over the new governance institutions is high, 
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there is likely to be low trust in the new governance institutions and low capacity to 
perform.  
 
In this article I will use the recent Thai experience in institutionalizing governance 
institutions to show comparatively, first, how the creation of governance institutions in 
a strong state–centric polity such as Thailand has inevitably been marked by high 
interference from the government executive and officials (Bowornwathana, 2000; 
2010a).    Second, I will compare the nature of trust in governance institutions. What 
factors account for the changing levels of trust in governance institutions?  Third, I shall 
compare the capacity of governance institutions to perform.  Fourth, I shall make 
observations about the relationships among trust in governance institutions, government 
interference, and the capacity to perform of governance institutions. 
 
Eleven governance institutions are chosen as case studies. They are: the Ombudsmen, 
the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the Administrative Court (AC), the 
Constitutional Court (CC), the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), the 
State Audit Commission (SAC), the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), the 
Election Commission (EC), the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Supreme 
Court of Justice’s Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political Positions 
(SCJCDPHPP).  These are governance institutions set up by the previous 1997 
Constitution, and reinstated by the present 2007   Constitution.    
 
COMPARING GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE IN GOVERNANCE 
INSTITUTIONS 
Since the promulgation of the previous 1997 Constitution, the newly created 
governance institutions have experienced constant interference from several 
governments. In particular, the Thaksin governments (2001-2006) had tried to 
reintroduce the authoritarian perspective toward government reform by championing his 
Company Model, or “the Country is My Company Approach” toward government 
reform” (Bowornwathana, 2006c; 2005; 2004).   Government reform initiatives chosen 
by the Thaksin Government were measures to enhance Thaksin’s ability to control and 
monopolize the state machine.  Administrative reform becomes an instrument for the 
dictatorial prime minister to consolidate political and administrative power.  I have 
argued that during Thaksin’s Governments, several tactics were used to control 
governance institutions.  First,   the Thaksin Governments tried to exercise control over 
senators who had the power to approve and select candidates to serve as commissioners 
on these governance institutions.  Second, the Thaksin Governments sent their men in as 
commissioner members and officials in these governance institutions. Third, the 
Thaksin Governments tried to bring some governance institutions under their chain of 
command.  Fourth, the Thaksin Government tried to exploit loopholes in the laws 
governing these governance institutions.  Fifth, the Thaksin Governments encouraged 
the practice of double standards by these governance institutions. Sixth, the Thaksin 
governments tried to slow down the birth or growth of certain governance institutions 
that they thought were harming them politically and business-wise. Seventh, the 
Thaksin Governments may downplay or discredit some governance institutions through 
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In 2004, the author made a rough estimation of the levels of government interference in 
governance institutions as shown in Table 1 (Bowornwathana, 2006c, p. 114).  At that 
time, government intervention in the Constitutional Court, the National Counter 
Corruption Commission, and the Anti-Money Laundering Office was, in my opinion, 
higher than other governance institutions under investigation. The CC and the NACC 
lost much credibility when they failed to convict Thaksin on charges of concealing his 
assets about 11 billion baht placed in the hands of servants and a chauffeur.  The NACC 
voted 8-1 against Thaksin. But the CC acquitted the then new Prime Minister Thaksin 
with a 8-7 vote. The case was closely reported by the media, and rumors were that 
Thaksin was able to bribe some CC judges.  The NACC was seen as a subordinate 
agency to CC.  In Thai politics during that time, the Senate chose judges for the CC.  If 
one can   control the majority of senators, one can then put one’s men in.  As for the 
case of AMLO, the prime minister exercised overwhelming power because he chaired 
the AMLO board.  So during Thaksin, the AMLO became an instrument for Thaksin to 
silence government critics and the opposition by, for example, ordering AMLO to 
investigate the financial transactions of government critics.  In short, government 
interference in these three governance institutions was high.  So the CC, NACC, and 
AMLO could not effectively perform their mandates of ensuring accountability of the 
government executive, especially of the Prime Minister Thaksin himself.         
 
Table 1: Government Interference in Governance Institutions (2004 estimation) 









Supreme Court - 
Senate - 
House of  Representatives - 
 
After Thaksin was ousted from power in 2006 by a military coup and demonstrations 
staged by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), Thai politics was under military 
rule for one year (2006-2007).  In 2008, the Thaksin’s group returned to power as MPs 
from the former Thai Rak Thai Party formed a majority in the House of Representatives 
under the new party called Palang Prachachon. There were two short-lived governments 
under the leaderships of Prime Minister Samak and Somchai (the husband of one of 
Thaksin’s sister). Both governments were accused by the PAD protesters and the 
opposition to be puppets or “nominees” of Thaksin. The belief was that Thaksin in-exile 
was giving orders to the Thai Government from abroad. This is a period when the 
government was rather weak and unstable, and governance institutions were able to 
function with lesser government interference.  It was in fact, decisions made by some 
governance institutions such as the CC, the NACC, and the EC that resulted in the 
recent dissolution of several political parties in the government coalitions such as the 
Palang Prachachon Party, the Chart Thai Party, and the Machimatippatai Party.  
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Members of the executive boards of these political parties were banned from politics for 
five years, and a new election is called in constituencies where some MPs were 
disqualified by the EC. 
 
Table 2 and Figure 1 show results of an opinion survey of 47 MPA students at 
Chulalongkorn University on December 8
th
 2008 with regard to their perception of the 
comparative levels of government interference in governance institutions.    
The question was: To what extent do you think that the following governance 
institutions have experienced government interference?  
 
From Table 2, the governance institutions that experience high government interference 
are the House of Representatives (4.23), the Senate (3.77), and the Election 
Commission (3.64). Those governance institutions that manifest low government 
interference are the Constitutional Court (2.51) and the Administrative Court (2.51).  
The remaining governance institutions have average level of government interference.  
The opinion survey shows that in Thai politics, the Parliament (the House of 
Representatives and the Senate) is not an effective mechanism to check and balance the 
use of government power by the executive. In the House of Representatives, the 
government controls the majority of MPs, and it is very difficult for the opposition to 
effectively scrutinize the use of government power by the cabinet. In the Thai Senate, it 
is almost impossible for senators to be truly neutral because senators are connected to 
MPs and the executive in various ways. There are several ways that a senator can be 
associated with the executive. Examples are: former political allies, alumni from old 
schools and universities, business partners, relatives, family members (for example, the 
husband is an MP, while his wife is a senator), etc..  Surprisingly, respondents believed 
that there is high government interference in the EC. Decisions made by the EC affected 
certain groups of politicians.  Those affected, accused the EC of not being impartial by 
favoring certain groups at the expense of others.  
 
Another interesting finding is the rather low level of government interference in the 
Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court. Compared to my estimates in 2004, 
the level of government interference in the CC in 2008 has drastically reduced. In fact, 
the verdicts of the CC in 2007 and 2008 had resulted in the dissolution of the 
government’s major political party of Thai Rak Thai Party and Palang Prachachon Party 
respectively. The level of government interference in the Administrative Court remains 
low as in 2004. This has to do with the way that administrative court system in Thailand 
is being set up as a court system like any ordinary court such as the criminal court.  
 
Compared to 2004, government interference in the NACC has reduced from high to 
moderate level.  In 2004, the then Prime Minister Thaksin was able to dictate Senate’s 
choices of NACC members.  A well-known corruption expert and buster, former 
Secretary-General of the old counter corruption commission (CCC), Klanarong 
Chanthick, was not chosen by Thaksin-dominated senators to become member of the 
NACC. Klanarong was then secretary-general of the CCC who represented the CCC in 
accusing Thaksin of concealing his assets. The 2008 NACC members were selected by 
the military government (Council of National Security) in September 22, 2006.  One of 
the NACC member is now Klanarong.  Clearly, the military coup group’s choices of 
NACC members displeased the Thaksin’s political group. The latter try to discredit the 
new NACC members as non-democratic because it was appointed by the military coup-
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47 2 5 3.13 .924
47 1 5 2.81 .900
47 1 4 2.51 .882
47 1 5 2.51 .953
47 1 5 2.91 1.039
47 1 5 2.91 1.080
47 1 5 3.09 1.018
47 2 5 3.64 1.031
47 2 5 3.77 1.005
47 2 5 4.23 .914














N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
makers, not by parliament.  This case study provides a good example in explaining the 
personalized nature of governance institutions.  It is not the institutionalization of 
governance institutions that matter, rather the issue is whose friends and foes get 
appointed as commissioner members to these powerful   governance institutions.     
 
In conclusion, the findings on government interference in governance institutions in 
Thailand are several. First, the newly-created governance institutions in Thailand are 
highly politicized.  Politicization of governance institutions in Thailand is widespread.  
The levels of government interference in governance institutions do not remain still.  
They fluctuate during different periods.  Second, the highly politicized nature of Thai 
politics and administration has inevitably made the quest for a truly neutral and 
competence governance institution that can monitor the use of government power in the 
name of the citizen very difficult to attain at least at the initial stage of reform 
implementation.    
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Source: Author, 2009 
 
COMPARING TRUST IN GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS 
Trust in governance institutions refer to the extent that one believes that a particular 
governance institution will deliver what they have promised. It has to do with the level 
of confidence in the reliability of a governance institution.  The concept of trust is 
culturally-bounded.  There are societies with low and high government trust.  In a social 
system such as Thailand that emphasizes personal relationships based on informal 
patron-client relations, the meaning of trust takes on a special one.  Trust becomes 
personal, and the process of building trust in institutions takes an unusually long time.  
For example, one trusts the NACC not because it is a well-developed institution with 
carefully designed standard operational procedures and legal layouts.  Instead, trust 
comes from the fact that one has faith in certain individuals in charge of a particular 
governance institution.       
 
Table 3 and Figure 2 illustrate the levels of trust in governance institutions exhibited by 
survey respondents consisting of 47 MPA students at Chulalongkorn University on 
December 8
th
, 2008. The respondents were asked: To what extent do you trust these 
governance institutions to monitor government?   According to the perception of the 
respondents in December 2008, governance institutions with high trust are in order 
respectively the Constitutional Court (3.94), the Administrative Court (3.89), the 
National Anti-Corruption Commission (3.75), the State Audit Commission (3.55), 
AMLO (3.38), and the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for People Holding Political 
Positions (3.36).  The Ombudsmen and the National Human Rights Commission both 
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47 1 5 3.13 .900
47 1 5 3.13 .969
47 1 5 3.89 .890
47 1 5 3.94 .942
47 2 5 3.74 .988
47 2 5 3.55 .880
47 2 5 3.38 .922
47 1 5 2.87 1.076
47 1 5 2.60 .970
47 1 4 2.34 .984














N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
received a score of 3.13.  Those governance institutions that received low scores are the 
House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Election Commission. They are seen as 
untrustworthy in performing the roles of the guardians of democratic governance.  
 
In general, the December 8
th
, 2008 scores of governance institutions indicate that the 
respondents have a positive attitude toward governance institutions.  I do not have an 
opinion survey of the respondents before that, but I think that trust in governance 
institutions fluctuates a lot depending on the nature of Thai politics.  Recent political 
developments before December 8
th
 may have shaped the attitudes of respondents.  
Examples are: the CC’s decision to dissolve three political parties in the government 
coalition including the major Palang Prachachon Party resulted in the discharge of 
Somchai as prime minister; and the conviction of Thaksin for two years imprisonment 
in the Rachada Land Deal.  
 
It could be that this group of respondents consisting of MPA students at Chulalongkorn 
University, are in general anti-Thaksin.  More attitudinal surveys are needed to 
determine whether the survey results are different when one asks different groups with 
different political stands.  Perhaps the present polarization of Thai politics into pro-
Thaksin (red shirts) and anti-Thaksin (yellow shirts) makes a difference.  If one asks the 
pro-Thaksin group, they may respond that the governance institutions such as the CC, 
the NACC and the SAC cannot be trusted. Such an answer is expected in a polarized 
polity. 
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RE P RE S E NTATIVE S
S UP  COURT
Figure 2: Comparing Trust in Governance Institutions 
   
Source: Author, 2009 
 
COMPARING THE CAPACITY OF GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS TO 
PERFORM 
The capacity to perform refers to the readiness of the governance institutions to play the 
roles of the guardians who monitor the use of government power by the executive and 
bureaucracy.  
 
The same group of 47 MPA students at Chulalongkorn University was asked to answer 
the question:  To what extent do you think that these governance institutions have the 
capacity to perform?  According to Table 4 and Figure 3, the respondents believed that  
the Constitutional Court (4.23), the Administrative Court (3.79), the NACC (3.79), the 
Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political Positions (3.66), and 
the AMLO (3.43) have high capacity to perform.  The Ombudsmen (3.15), the NHRC 
(3.23), and the EC (3.04) have average capacity. The worst ones are the House of 






International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 


























47 1 5 3.15 .978
47 1 9 3.23 1.202
47 2 5 3.79 .832
47 2 9 4.23 1.306
47 2 5 3.79 1.041
47 1 5 3.70 1.061
47 1 5 3.43 1.137
47 1 5 3.04 1.103
47 1 5 2.77 1.108
47 1 5 2.45 .996
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Table 4: Comparing the Capacity of Governance Institutions to Perform 
  Source: Author, 2009 
 




















  Source: Author, 2009 
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RELATIONSHIPS AMONG TRUST, GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE, AND 
CAPACITY 
Suppose if one considers trust in governance institutions to be the dependent variable, 
with two independent variables: government interference and performance capacity.  
Figure 4 shows that trust in governance institutions is positively related to the capacity 
of governance institutions to perform. In fact, the trust line and the capacity line almost 
parallel one another.  On the contrary, there is an opposite association between trust and 
capacity with government interference.  That is, the higher the government interference, 
the lower the trust in governance institutions and the lower their capacity to perform.  
 
Figure 5 shows the relationship between trust and government interference. High trust 
governance institutions are strongly associated with low government interference.  In 
the same fashion, low trust governance institutions are also strongly associated with 
high government interference. 
 
Figure 6 shows the relationship between trust in governance institutions and the 
capacity to perform.  The relationship between trust and performance capacity of 
governance institutions is almost a straight line.  High trust is strongly associated with 
high capacity to perform. Low trust is associated with low performance capacity.  
 































































































































International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 11  ·  Issue 2  ·  2010  ·  © International Public Management Network 
74 
 












































































International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 11  ·  Issue 2  ·  2010  ·  © International Public Management Network 
75 
 


















    Source: Author, 2009 
 
Eleven governance institutions in Thailand were compared in terms of government 
interference, trust in governance institutions, and the capacity to perform. The findings 
suggest that there is a strong association between high trust, low government 
interference, and high performance capacity.  
 
As of this writing Thailand was experiencing a period in which citizen trust in the 
national government was very low. In mid-April, 2010 the Thai Election Commission 
ordered the ruling party to be dissolved for allegedly concealing campaign 
contributions. Anti-government protesters had pressed for Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva's resignation for months. His coalition government was further weakened as 
senior military officials and leaders of other coalition parties demanded a call for 
elections for a new government within a short period of time.      
 
Future research on governance institutions should take into consideration the political 
environment that these governance institutions are implemented.  Thai traditional 
practices and values such as the strong state-centric tradition, personal relations,   
patronage, nepotism, and corruption must be taken into account.  The challenging 
question is: Is it possible to develop strong independent and competent governance 
institutions in Thailand?   From a bureaucratic politics view point, the creation of 
governance institutions may be seen as a manifestation of bureaucratic expansion by the 
senior bureaucrats who after retirement assume positions in these new governance 





































International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 11  ·  Issue 2  ·  2010  ·  © International Public Management Network 
76 
 
institutions foreign to the Thai context? (Bowornwathana, 2010b).  Can we really find 
truly neutral, competent leaders, and persons free from political interference to act as 
commission members of these governance institutions?  As of now, the cultivation of 
trust in governance institutions in the Thai polity is very much a matter of politics, 
personalism, and uncertainty.     
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